CEO Letter

The Buyer Already on Your Cap Table

To the founders, directors and investors building cardiovascular companies,

Boston Scientific completed its acquisition of Bolt Medical in 2025 and, in the same year, recorded a $185 million gain on the company. The gain, recognized when the acquisition closed, came from remeasuring the roughly 26 percent stake Boston Scientific had held since 2019, when it developed the concept that helped establish Bolt. It is an accounting consequence of owning part of a company before buying the rest, and it says nothing about whether Bolt's shareholders received more or less than they otherwise would have. What it does show is how far into the cap table a strategic buyer can already be on the day a sale is negotiated.

That is the subject of this letter. A strategic financing does not set the eventual exit price; clinical results, commercial traction and the market for the asset do most of that work. But the terms of a strategic round can shape two things that matter a great deal at exit: how many credible bidders are prepared to compete, and how the proceeds divide among shareholders. In cardiovascular MedTech, where the early strategic investor can also be the natural acquirer, as three of these four transactions illustrate, those terms deserve the same scrutiny a board gives the valuation.

Start with what the companies disclosed. When Boston Scientific agreed in January 2025 to acquire the 74 percent of Bolt it did not already own, it offered about $443 million upfront and up to $221 million more on regulatory milestones. In May 2026, Boston Scientific paid $1.5 billion for 33.75 percent of MiRus in non-voting equity, on top of $100 million paid earlier, together with an exclusive option to acquire a new subsidiary holding the MiRus transcatheter aortic valve replacement (TAVR) business. Once certain clinical and regulatory milestones are met, exercising that option costs a further $3.0 billion, with sales-based payments after that. A second option, over mitral and tricuspid valve assets, opens only if the first is exercised. If the option is not exercised or does not close, Boston Scientific's stake is forfeited, cut by about 75 percent or exchanged, depending on the circumstances.

Seen from the buyer's side, the MiRus structure is a disciplined use of capital: Boston Scientific has fixed the cash price of the TAVR business before the pivotal trial reports, and it can walk away at a cost it disclosed in advance. Seen from the company's side, the same structure means the optioned business has a known counterparty and a published strike price while the option runs. A rival considering a bid would be weighing that price, and the option holder's position, before it began.

The broader point is that not every strategic right carries the same exit consequence. The test I apply is whether a right changes what a second bidder expects to gain from showing up. A right of first refusal can. It lets the holder buy on terms a third party has already accepted, and a 2012 economic model of these rights in the American Law and Economics Review found that it tends to transfer value from other buyers to the holder. If a rival expects to be matched, it has less reason to spend on diligence, so I would expect fewer serious bidders, though the effect in any one sale depends on the asset and the field. A right of first offer is usually the better trade for the company: the company offers the holder the first chance to buy on terms the company proposes, and if the holder declines, the company may sell elsewhere on terms no better for the new buyer, so the market still sets the ceiling. Information rights and a board observer seat set no price at all, but they give one potential bidder a view of the data well before anyone else opens a data room. Each of these can be worth granting. None should be granted as a courtesy.

Proceeds deserve the same care as price. Haemonetics bought Vivasure, a developer of large-bore vessel closure for structural heart and endovascular procedures, in January 2026 for €100 million upfront. Net of Haemonetics' own earlier investments and loans and other closing adjustments, the upfront payment was about €52 million, with up to €85 million more tied to sales growth and other milestones. Stryker's acquisition of Amplitude Vascular Systems, a lithotripsy developer for complex peripheral arterial disease, this May was about $435 million in cash and up to $400 million in milestones, leaving nearly half the announced maximum contingent on events after closing. Neither figure tells us whether the strategic history raised or lowered the price. Both show that the headline number and what shareholders take home at closing can be very different, and that a credible exit model starts from the net upfront figure and weights each milestone by the odds of its trigger and by who controls that trigger after the sale.

None of this is an argument against strategic capital. Bolt began as a Boston Scientific concept, Boston Scientific had paid MiRus $1.6 billion before its pivotal results, and Haemonetics invested in and lent to Vivasure before buying it. All four programs were sold or optioned while still investigational or awaiting US approval, which is the stage at which a strategic partner is often the investor best placed to underwrite clinical risk. The company receives capital and validation that a financial investor may not offer. The investor may receive an information lead and, in some structures, a price agreed before the outcome is known. The board's job is to know which of those it is granting and to be paid for it.

A board signing a strategic round is therefore deciding three questions that will matter at exit, whether or not they appear on the agenda: how long any exclusivity runs, whether the investor can match an offer or must be offered first, and what the investor sees between board meetings. Any future acquirer will read those answers in diligence. They are far easier to negotiate before anyone is bidding.

Sincerely,

Jordan Foster
Founding Partner & CEO, UnifiMed


November 3, 2026. Transaction terms as disclosed by the companies in SEC filings and press releases as of October 20, 2026. Interpretation of how strategic rights may affect competing bidders is UnifiMed's analysis, informed by Kahan, Leshem and Sundaram, American Law and Economics Review (2012). For general information only; not legal, tax or investment advice.